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1964

ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES
IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
By

KEITH ANDERSON*

Lawyers are forbidden to pay "marked attention" to a judge or
to attempt to gain from him any "special consideration or favor."'
Conversely the judge cannot accept gifts or favors from lawyers
practicing before him.2 His conduct should be free not only from
impropriety but from its appearance,' and from the "impression"
that any person can influence him. 4 He must ignore partisan demands, avoid incurring obligations which might "appear" to interfere with proper administration of his court '! and have no relationships which might "tend to arouse the suspicion" that he may
not be completely impartial. 7 Not least, he must select trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians, and other appointees "with a
view solely to their character and fitness," and the power to make
such appointments should not be exercised by him for "personal or
partisan advantage."
In short, relationships between lawyers and judges should be
marked by considerable reserve; there is a gulf between them
broader than that which separates other men. They must avoid not
merely the fact of impropriety, but its appearance.
This ethereal code does not exactly fit the maculate world of
party politics. The judicial candidate cannot hope to be elected unless someone contributes work and money to his campaign. Since
only lawyers are ordinarily willing to do this, judicial election campaigns always create the appearance of an unhealthy obligation running from the judge to lawyers. There is a basic conflict between professional ethical ideas and the practical necessities of
democratic elections, and the profession has had no real success in
resolving this dilemma.
The canons themselves offer a little help. Apparently the bar
has a special obligation, beyond that of other citizens, to aid in the
selection of a strong bench.9 During a campaign the judge must
"refrain from all conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable
suspicion that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy ...he should not permit others to
do anything in behalf of his candidacy which would reasonably lead
to such suspicion."10 And this applies equally to the candidate who
is not yet a judge. 1 ' While the judge may further his campaign
* Member of the Denver Bar, and a member of the Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee.
1 Professional Canon 3. The professional canons are cited herein as "P.C."
2 Judicial Canon 32. Cited herein as "J.C."
3 J.C. 4.
4J.C. 13.
5J.C. 14.
6 J.C. 24.
7 J.C. 26.
SJ.C. 12.
9 P.C. 2; A.B.A. Op. 189 (1938).
10 J.C. 30.
11 A.B.A. Op. 226 (1941). "While this Canon [J.C. 30] refers to a judge who is a candidate,
its admonition should be respected by a lawyer who seeks to be judge. The prestige of the lawyer
candidate is largely potential, dependent upon his success. But if the chances of success are substantial, then the prestige of the candidate is capable of the same abuse as that of the judge. Each
should observe the same restraint, and for the same reasons." (Bracketed material supplied.)
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through speeches in his own behalf, he may not accept office in his
political party, be a delegate to its conventions, endorse other candidates or-otherwise be active in partisan politics. 12 But the canons
are silent on the basic question: how does the judge remain free
from the slightest breath of suspicion, even though he owes his
position largely to gifts of money and work from lawyers? Rulings
of ethics committees are beginning to cast some feeble light in this
thicket.
CAMPAIGN GIFTS:

JUDICAL CANON

32.

Judicial Canon 32, which prohibits a judge from receiving a
gift, has been relaxed in order to adjust to the practical realities
of elections. The judge cannot himself accept gifts of money, and
the canons make no exception for campaign contributions. Therefore gifts must be made to a committee, never to the judge himself. 13 It is implicit that the committee cannot be a conduit for
passing money to the judge. If he cannot receive it directly, neither
can he take it indirectly. All the funds must be spent by the committee. And, since he cannot personally receive the gift, he cannot
solicit it. 14 Indeed, there are some gifts which the candidate may
not permit his committee to accept. The gift may be taken only
if the cost of the campaign " . . . when reasonably conducted, exceeds that which the candidate would be expected to bear personally . ..the amount contributed must, of course, be only that
which the circumstances warrant."' 5 This appears to be a delicate
way of saying that the judge's partisans should not collect more
than the campaign actually costs. Most plainly, he may not permit
his committee to accept any contribution whose amount or source
indicate that it is designed to influence him.
The same principles apply to lawyers who make such gifts.' 6
(A) The lawyer must not himself be a candidate for receiver,
trustee, guardian ad litem or any other appointment, (B) the gift
must not be part of his litigation strategy, and (C) the size of the
gifts must not be sufficient to provide a surplus for distribution to
the judge after the campaign is over. Since a lawyer may contribute, it follows that he may also solicit contributions.' 7
COERCIVE TACTICS:

JUDICIAL CANON

30.

This canon prohibits the judge, the lawyer-candidate and their
partisans from using the power and prestige of judicial office to
further the candidacy. A judge may not solicit endorsement of
his candidacy by members of the bar. A judge who sent out letters
asking the addressees to have their friends mail postcards urging
12 J.C. 28.
13 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 33 (1964). The statement in A.B.A. Op. 226 (1941), "...
it would
also be preferable that such contribution be made to a campaign committee rather than to the
candidate personally," is too permissive. "A judge should not accept any presents or favors . . .
from lawyers practising before him.
J.C. 32 (Emphasis added.)
14 N.Y. County Op. 304 (1933).
15 A.B.A. Op. 226 (1941).
16 N.Y. County Op. 304 (1933). "A lawyer may not with propriety make a contribution ...
under circumstances which might justify the inference that the contribution is a 'device or attempt
to gain from a judge special consideration or favor'."
17 A.B.A. Informal Op. 626 (1963).
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his reappointment by the governor violated this canon and also
Judicial Canon 34, " . . . his conduct shall be above reproach."'"
Lawyers, however, may circulate petitions endorsing judicial candidates, and other lawyers may sign them. 9 . While this ruling
apparently permits the normal postcard campaign, the practice
of sending postcards to a lawyer and asking him to address them
and then return them to the campaign manager for mailing
(so that the degree of his compliance may be determined) is a
virulent breach of Judicial Canon 30.20 Obviously, the lawyer is
coerced. The candidate cannot avoid responsibility, since he
" .. .should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his
candidacy which would reasonably lead to" the suspicion that he
is using the power and prestige of the office to promote his election. 2 1 Even so, the lawyer should have the "courage and
moral
22
stamina" to resist such pressures when they are applied.
Under Canon 30 the judicial candidate may not answer legal
questions submitted to him in a radio program, 23 nor may he unfairly state his own qualifications, unjustly attack incumbents, or
indicate his probable decisions from the bench. For example, he
may not promise that he will refuse to issue injunctions2 4 against
labor unions or decrees in foreclosure and eviction cases.
PARTISAN ACITIES:

JUDICIAL CANON

28.

Under this canon the judge's activities as a member of his
political party are severely curtailed.2 5 "He should avoid making
political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or
contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of candidates
for political office and participation in party conventions. He
should neither accept nor retain a place on any party committee,
nor act as party leader, nor engage generally in partisan activities."
But during his own campaign he can speak at political gatherings
and contribute to his own party. Judges may not, however, contribute to campaign funds which are to be used in an election in
which the judges are not themselves running. The canon only
permits the judge to contribute to "the party that has nominated
him and seeks his election or re-election." This
could never be the
2
case except in a year when he is on the ballot. 6
PATRONAGE:

JUDICIAL CANON

12.

In states where judges are chosen in contested elections,
it is difficult to believe that receivers, masters, guardians and the
like are always "selected with a view solely to their character and
18A.B.A. Op. 139 (1935). "Persons to whom the foregoing letter was mailed, who had or
contemplated that they might have a matter pending before the judge, would in many cases feel
under some pressure to comply with his request . .. " " Ordinarily a judge should stand on his
official record and leave the promotion of his candidacy to others." See also A.B.A. Op. 105 (1934).
19 A.B.A. Op. 189 (1938).
20 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 33 (1964).
21 J.C. 30.
22 A.B.A. Op. 189 (1938).
23 A.B.A. Op. 93 (1933).
24 Michigan Op. 74 (1941).
25A.B.A. Op. 193 (1939); see also generally A.B.A. Op. 113 (1934), which also restricts somewhat the activities of his bailiff and, perhaps too optimistically, his wife.
26 A.B.A. Op. 289 (1955).
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fitness." On the contrary, partisan activity seems to be a primary
qualification. A rule that judges may not distribute patronage
to their campaign committees would be a healthy development,
but there is no such rule now, and until there is, almost superhuman strength of character would be required for a judge to
overlook his campaign manager in distributing patronage, even
though the manager may not be the best-qualified lawyer avail27
able.
ADVERTISING:

PROFESSIONAL

CANON

27.

"It is unprofessional to solicit professional emp'oyment
by . . .personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for
professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, . . . and all other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible . . . ,,28
Since judges are lawyers, they are bound by this canon. An
exception has been created for elections, but its scope is strictly
limited to the necessities.2 9 Therefore a candidate for district
attorney may send out letters soliciting votes, and he may distribute campaign literature with his picture and a statement that he
is a lawyer. 30 He can make newspaper releases, but only if they
are for the sole purpose of furthering his candidacy. Similarly, he
may state in advertisements that he is a lawyer, but only if the
advertisements are during the campaign.," And he may be identified in television programs as a lawyer, when he is a candidate
32
for Congress.
But even this canon is not completely repealed. If a lawyer
files for an office to which he has no hope or intention of being
elected, and uses his candidacy as an excuse for a barrage of mailings, campaign cards and statements to the press which are really
designed to acquaint potential clients with the lawyer's name, he
violates the canon. 33 Unfortunately the candidate's motives are
usually known only to himself so that few violations of this sort
are ever punished. Nevertheless a liberal policy is essential, even
though it permits the sham candidate to advertise himself as a
27 N.Y. County Op. 422 (1953) discusses (rather uncomfortably) a similar question: appointment of the judge's former partner. " ...
an occasional appointment by a judge of a former
partner, with whom the judge has no financial relationship and presuming that the former partner
is otherwise qualified, would not in our opinion be an improper act." But since the act may well
be misunderstod, ' . . . unusual care should be token to avoid the charge of favoritism. Con.
sideration should be given both to the frequency of such appointments, as well Cs to the size of
the matters." These principles apply even more strongly to those who play a prominent part in
the judge's election.
28 P.C. 27.
29 Michigan Op. 74 (1941).
30 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. 656 (1963).
31 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. 529 (1962).
32 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. C-230(b)(1961).
33 A.B.A. Informal Op. No. 546 (1962). "On the other hand, releases relating to the lawyer's
civic and social activities, as a lawyer, might well be included within the forbidden area of
indirect advertising for professional employment; obviously, he should avoid the suspicion of any
such motive."
Drinker, Legal Ethics 248 (1953). "The candidate for a public office who is a lawyer may
advise the public of this when the office sought is one in which his legal train;ng adds to his
qualifications to fill the office (Wash. 9; Mich. 52; Mo. 36) but may not use h's candidacy as an
excuse for advertising that he is a lawyer. (App. A 65; Mich. 89; Cleveland 10; . . .)"
(Emphasis
supplied.)
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lawyer while the genuine candidate is advertising for votes. The
candidate should not, however, use his professional letterhead for
campaign advertising. Thus a lawyer who was also mayor of his
city could not mail political messages to 15,000 voters upon his
professional
letterhead. Plainly this is a solicitation of legal bus34
iness.
The judge's campaign managers must be careful not to advertise themselves in the press. While few of the rulings deal with
elections, the analogies are strongly suggestive. A lawyer may not
pose for pictures or submit material to a newspaper or a magazine
since this advertises him to possible future clients.; And he must
suppress laudatory newspaper comments about himself."6 Therefore he may not inspire or furnish newspaper comments concerning cases in which he is engaged,3 7 or make any other unsolicited
newspaper release."" He may not permit others to make a release
stating that he is leaving governmental service and will resume
practice, if the release also describes his experience or qualifications.'" He may not permit his name to be published in an advertisement for a charitable cause along with his address or a statement that he is a lawyer. The advertisement is ethical if he is
not identified as a lawyer, however. 40 And obviously the use of
his firm's name in a charitable advertisement " . . . smacks some-

what of self-laudation or commercialism, even though not so intended."'4 1 He cannot write "letters to the editor" in which he is
identified as a lawyer, and in a small community where many
readers would know he is a lawyer, he may not write such letters
at all where "The subject matter was of a controversial nature
42
and one that could easily require the services of an attorney.
From all this one infers that lawyers who are members of the
judge's campaign committee should not publish their own names
in newspapers. Although there does not seem to be any decision
precisely in point the charitable advertisement cases are indistinguishable. This rule should apply both to press releases and
to advertisements endorsing the candidate. It clearly prohibits the
kind of advertisement in which the endorsing lawyers are listed
by name.4 3 Often these imply in a more or less subtle way that
the endorsers are men of substance in the profession. The mere
statement, "we have observed Judge X in court daily" certainly
leads one to believe that the endorsers are unusually experienced
litigators, since few lawyers are in court "daily." But even a tombstone advertisement which merely lists the endorsing lawyers by
name may carry the inference that they are respected (and in
effect endorsed) by the judge, who would perhaps not otherwise
Cp. Michigan Op. 89 (1945) with A.B.A. Op. 93 (1933).
A.B.A. Op. 42 (1931).
A.B.A. Op. 62 (1932).
A.B.A. Op. 140 (1935).
A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. C-479 (1962).
A.B.A. Op. 184 (1938).
A.B.A. Informal Op. 547 (1962).
A.B.A. Informal Op. 653 (1963).
A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. C-473 (1962).
43 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 32 (1964); the A.B.A.'s committee has, however, reached an opposite
result, authorizing at least one advertisement of this type. A.B.A. Informal Dec. C-748 (1964).
34
35
3
37
38
39
40
41
42
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permit the advertisement. In any case, the necessity principle
does not apply. The qualifications and biography of Judge X can
(and should) be presented to the voters in an advertisement paid
for by the "Committee of 100 lawyers for the election of Judge X,"
who are not identified by name.
The solicitation of votes by a letter-writing or postcard campaign, and solicitation of funds on the lawyer's letterhead, are
apparently authorized only if addressed to brother lawyers, personal friends and clients who already know the sender to be a
lawyer, because this is "warranted by personal relations. 4 4 Mailings on a professional letterhead to any large group, whatever the
purpose, necessarily advertise the sender and are forbidden. Similarly, solicitation on the "Committee of Lawyers" type of letterhead appears to violate the canon, because few of the recipients
would have the necessary personal
relationship with all the law4
yers listed on the letterhead. 5
CONCLUSIONS

Underlying all these opinions is the general idea that the
canons will be relaxed to the extent necessary to permit conduct
of a vigorous campaign, but no further. Practices not absolutely
necessary for that purpose are condemned. It is unfortunately
plain, however, that even the most ethically conducted campaign
involves a series of exceptions to the canons which warp their
spirit and which add nothing to the public respect for our judicial
system.
The lawyer-candidate must advertise himself on a massive
scale. Judges inevitably incur obligations to those who manage
campaigns and donate money which certainly "tend to arouse the
suspicion" that the judge may not have an "impartial attitude of
mind in the administering of his judicial duties." Doubtless there
is occasionally some substance in these shadows, at least in the
distribution of patronage. As long as judges, through their committees, must accept gifts of money and work from lawyers there
will be gnawing doubts as to their freedom from influence and
bias. Nevertheless, if a stricter attitude should be taken toward
campaign activities of lawyers, the selection of judges will be left
entirely in the hands of party organizations and newspapers, both
relatively uninformed lay groups. A serious deterioration in the
quality of the bench might well result. Wherever judges are
chosen in contested elections some bending of professional standards is vitally necessary.
The ultimate solution must lie in adoption of another method
of selecting judges. The federal system appears to produce judges
at least as good as those selected in state elections, and it does so
without compromising their dignity or independence. There are of
course a number of other plans. Until one of them is adopted,
however, the candidate and his manager must maintain an exceedingly delicate and uneasy balance between principle and necessity.
44 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. 626 (1963).
45 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 32, supro (1964).

